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ADVANCING THE REBIRTH OF
ENVIRONMENTAL COMMON LAW
JASONJ. CZARNEZKI*
MARK L. THOMSEN**

Abstract- Federal law often fails to mitigate environmental harm. An alternative litigation response when federal avenues prove ineffective is reliance on state common law doctrines, especially public and private nuisance. A rebirth of the common law is occurring. This Article provides
examples of the rebirth of environmental common law and suggests how
common law claims and remedies in the environmental context can mitigate environmental harm.
INTRODUCTION

Federal law strives to mitigate environmental harm such as air
pollution and hazardous waste contamination, but with mixed results.
The Clean Air Act (CAA) requires that air quality standards be established for pollutants that endanger the public health and welfare.'
Standards already exist for carbon monoxide, lead, nitrogen dioxide,
ozone, particulate matter, and sulfur dioxide.2 Yet, carbon dioxide is
the major force behind global climate change, and no carbon dioxide
standards exist despite efforts to make it a "criteria pollutant" under
the CAA. 3 In cases of hazardous waste contamination, some polluters
agree to perform remedial work that may be unsuccessful or inadequate and does not provide complete property restoration for adjacent landowners. 4 Federal environmental law fails to deter polluters

* Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School; A.B., J.D., University of
Chicago.
** Partner, Cannon & Dunphy, S.C.;J.D., Marquette University Law School.
The authors wish to thank Gary Ballesteros, Michael O'Hear, Chad Oldfather and
Glenn Salvo for their helpful comments, as well as Jennifer Birkholz, Robert D. Crivello,
Aaron Hall, Alyson Paulick and Quinn Williams for their research assistance.
I Clean Air Act § 108(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1) (2000).
2 40

C.F.R.§ 50.4-12 (2005).

3 See infra Part III.A; KirkJohnson, 3 States SueE.PA. to Regulate Emissions of Carbon Dioxide, N.Y. TIMES,June 5, 2003, at B2; see also infta note 84 and accompanying text.
4 See infra Part III.B.
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and protect the environment for a variety of reasons. 5 For example,
national standards may not be suitable for greenhouse gases, 6 and
federal agencies sometimes lack the resources to effectively perform
restoration activities 7 or federal standards are inadequate to restore
affected resources to a state's more stringent standard. An alternative
litigation response when federal avenues prove ineffective is reliance
on state common law doctrines, especially public and private nuisance.
A rebirth of the common law is already occurring. 8 Under a
common law public nuisance theory, states have filed suit against energy companies to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. 9 Additionally,
private landowners affected by hazardous waste contamination have
begun to utilize common law private nuisance claims.10 A traditional
advantage of common law claims is that their remedies allow for compensation to the individual pollution victims." Moreover, with remedies fashioned by the state courts, or federal courts applying state law,
5 See, e.g., Jason J. Czarnezki, Shifting Science, Considered Costs, and Static Statutes: The Interpretation of Expansive Environmental Legislation, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 431, 434 (2006) (discussing narrow interpretation of the federal environmental regulatory regime).
6 See Vhronique Bugnion & David M. Reiner, A Game of Climate Chicken: Can EPA Regulate
Greenhouse Gases Before the U.S. Senate Ratifies the Kyoto Protocol?, 30 ENVTL. L. 491, 507 (2000)
("Moreover, the concept of a standard expressed in terms of a parts per million concentration is especially problematic for greenhouse gases because the United States is 'only' responsible for perhaps one-quarter of the global concentration of the gases. Thus, setting a
national standard in the United States for greenhouse gas emissions would only accomplish a
fraction of the emissions reductions needed to meet a global concentration target.");
Nicholle Winters, Carbon Dioxide: A Pollutant in the Air but Is the EPA Correct That It Is Not an
"AirPollutant"?,104 COLUM. L. REV. 1996, 2001-02 (2004) (citing Memorandum from Robert
E. Fabricant, EPA General Counsel, to Marianne L. Horinko, EPA Acting Administrator
(Aug. 28, 2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/airlinks/co2_general-counsel_opinion.pdf
(concluding that carbon dioxide cannot be regulated under the Clean Air Act (CAA) because "the nature of the global pool would mean that... the entire world would either be in
or out of compliance. Such a situation would be inconsistent with a basic underlying premise
of the CAA regime .. . .")). While national standards for greenhouse gases may be "unworkable," according to EPA, "regulating CO 2 emissions from automobiles is perfectly feasible."
Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 69-70 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel,J., dissenting).
7 See infra Part III.B.
8 See BRUCE YANDLE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: CREATING WEALTH IN HUMMINGBIRD ECONOMIES 114 (1997); Tom Kuhnle, The Rebirth of
Common Law Actions for Addressing HazardousWaste Contamination, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 187,
214 (1996).
9 See infra Part III.A; see also Editorial, A Novel Tactic on Warming, N.Y. TIMES, July 28,
2004, at A14; N.C. Sues TVA, Saying Emissions from Plants Make Residents Sick, Hurt Economy,
PLATrTs, Feb. 6, 2006 (on file with authors), available at http://construction.ecnextcom/
coms2/summary_0249-109630_ITM-platts.
10 See Kuhnle, supra note 8, at 191; see also Part III.B (discussing Dyer v. Waste Mgmt. of
Wisconsin, Inc., No. 01-CV-1866 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Waukesha County argued Dec. 6, 2004)).
1 Kuhnle, supra note 8, at 222.
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common law claims can also promote timely restoration of damaged
natural resources and polluted lands-goals of the major federal environmental statutes. 12 As administrative agencies can have difficulty in
implementing cleanup of polluted sites and deterring pollution, perhaps common law courts should shoulder a greater share of this responsibility.
This Article, from a descriptive standpoint, provides examples of
the rebirth of the environmental common law, and, for normative
purposes, suggests how common law claims and remedies in the environmental context can continue to flourish. Part I of this Article discusses the common law origins of environmental law, as well as the
public policy and environmental costs and benefits of invoking common law remedies in environmental torts. Part II considers whether
state common law remedies are preempted by federal environmental
statutes. Part III describeg two pending cases as examples of the rebirth of the environmental common law, where common law remedies were invoked to abate air and hazardous waste pollution. Part III
also counsels on the difficulties of showing causation and determining
remedies. Part IV offers up a valuable tool to promote the rebirth of
the environmental common law and environmental restoration, arguing that judges should apply a common law damage remedy in cases
arising under state law, entitled the common law fund.
I.

THE COMMON LAW ORIGINS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

Environmental law and regulation "has evolved ...

from reliance

on tort law to an emphasis on end-of-pipe controls through direct
regulation and finally to an emphasis on pollution prevention." 13 Despite the fact that common law tort claims have been used to abate
pollution since the seventeenth century, 14 the bulk of common law
cases and lawsuits came during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, creating what is now known as environmental law. 15
At common law, landowners have the right to enjoy the benefits
of their land free from "unwanted and unreasonable invasions by

12See, e.g., YANDLE, supra note 8, at 110; Kuhnle, supra note 8, at 223.
13 NANCY KUBASEK & GARY S. SILVERMAN, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 127 (2005).
14 YANDLE, supra note 8, at 88-90 (citing William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816

(1611)).
15 Roger E. Meiners, Stacie Thomas & Bruce Yandle, Burning Rivers, Common Law, and
Institutional Choice for Water Quality, in THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 68
(Roger E. Meiners & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2000).
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people or pollution" 16-sic utere tuo, ut alienum non laedas.17 Prior to
modern-day command and control statutes, the nuisance cause of action was the main tool for environmental protection.1 8 Actions can be
either public or private, and the nuisances themselves can be both. 19
A public nuisance claim can be brought against an action that interferes with public health and rights. 20 However, public nuisance ac-

tions are generally brought by a public official or a member of the
21
public meeting the "special injury" requirement.
A private nuisance affects a limited number of land owners, 22 and
creates "a substantial and unreasonable interference with the use and
enjoyment of an interest in land." 23 The interference may be inten-

tional and unreasonable, or unintentional if negligent, reckless or
abnormally dangerous.24 The Restatement (Second) of Torts balances the
gravity of the harm against the utility of the conduct to determine
whether actions give rise to such a claim.2 5 Courts have taken various
approaches to the balancing test.26 Some courts, rather than adopting
the Restatement balancing approach, instead look for a level of interference that crosses some liability threshold. 27 Despite the prevalence
16

YANDLE,

supra note 8, at 91.

17 The Latin phrase means that one should use his or her own property in such a man-

ner as not to injure that of another. Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 77 S.E.2d 682, 689 (N.C.
1953).
18 YANDLE, supra note 8, at 91. The line between trespass, a direct physical invasion,
and nuisance, an indirect invasion, has blurred over time, and there may be benefits to
suing in trespass as opposed to nuisance. For further discussion of common law environmentalism, specifically nuisance and trespass, see Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common
Law and the Conceit of Modern Environmental Policy, 7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 923, 926-38
(1999).
19YANDLE, supra note 8, at 91.
20 Id.; see also Meiners, Thomas, & Yandle, supra note 15, at 68. For a brief discussion of
the law of public nuisance as it applies to environmental cases, see generally James A.
Sevinsky, Public Nuisance: A Common-Law Remedy Among the Statutes, 5 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T
29 (1990).
21
YANDLE, supra note 8, at 91-92.
22 Id. at 92.
23 Id. (citing Ryan v. City of Emmetsburg, 4 N.W.2d 435 (Iowa 1942) and Lederman v.
Cunningham, 283 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955)); see also Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co.,
77 S.E.2d 682, 689 (N.C. 1953); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821F, 822 (1979).
24 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS

§ 822.

Id. § 826. Factors to determine the gravity of harm include the extent and character
of harm, social value of plaintiff's use, suitability to location, and burden on plaintiff to
avoid harm. Id. § 827. Factors to determine the utility of the actor's conduct include social
value of actor's conduct, suitability to location, and impracticality of preventing harm. Id.
25

§ 828.
26

See Meiners, Thomas & Yandle, supra note 15, at 69-70.

27 See, e.g., Jost v. Dairyland Power Coop., 172 N.W.2d 647, 653 (Wis. 1969).
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of environmental tort claims, the difficulty of fashioning appropriate
remedies may create problems when using tort law to control pollu28
tion and other environmental harms.

Courts can abate the activity by granting the plaintiff injunctive
relief29 or requiring the victims to pay damages. 3 0 The courts can allow the activity to continue if the defendant pays damages,3 ' or they
can simply deny relief. However, an award of permanent damages may
fail to abate the pollution because it leaves injured parties without a
remedy for future harms and provides no motivation for the polluter
to stop polluting if payment of damages is cost-effective. 32 Common
law damage remedies put courts in the difficult informational position of deciding what amount of damages is appropriate to compen33
sate the victims, or whether to limit pollution to a certain level.

Courts are also reluctant to grant an injunction for fear that its
scope may be too broad or narrow and that, if the injunction is ineffective, bargaining will not take place between the parties. 34 Courts
often balance the economic harm caused by the pollution against the
costs of the injunction, and, if the harm from the injunction is greater,
courts will only award damages.3 5 In addition, tort law plaintiffs face
the burden of having to show causation, which can be especially
difficult if there are multiple polluters, and often plaintiffs must expend substantial financial resources to bring common law tort actions
36
against entities having potentially far greater resources.
The difficulties in adjudicating common law tort claims progressively caused a shift from tort actions to more direct regulation of environmental harm. 37 Both state governments and the federal government became more involved in the creation of command-and-control
statutes and other legislation designed to set standards and mandate

See KUBASEK & SILVERMAN, supra note 13, at 132.
See, e.g., Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972).
30 See, e.g., Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 77 S.E.2d 682, 690 (N.C. 1953).
s1 See, e.g., Boomer v. Ad. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 877 (N.Y. App. Ct. 1970).
32 KUBASEK & SILVERMAN, supra note 13, at 132.
28

29

33See id.
34 Cf R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & ECON. 1, 8-15 (1960).
35

KUBASEK & SILVERMAN, supra note 13, at 132.

36 Id.; see also David Doege, A Pile of Legal Issues, MILWAUKEEJ. SENTINEL, June 26, 2004,

available at http://www.jsonline.com/news/wauk/junO4/238996.asp (last visited Jan. 4,
2007) (Marquette Professor Michael O'Hear stated, "These cases can be tremendously
complicated. They can go on for years and they can cost millions just to litigate.").
37 For a brief summary of the transition from nuisance law to environmental regula-

tion, seeJESSE

DUKEMINIER &JAMES

E.

KRIER, PROPERTY

777-79 (5th ed. 2002).
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compliance through threat of fines for violation. 38 Beginning in the
late 1960s and early 1970s, state and federal statutes created regulations to attempt to control pollution, 39 and since that time there has
been a proliferation of federal and state environmental statutes and
40
administrative regulations.
Modern environmental law grew out of the common law tort system, and modern regulation of pollution arose in an effort to deal with
the inadequacies of the common law. 4 1 However, in many instances, in
light of the complexities and bureaucracies of modern environmental
regulation, the common law still provides an effective mechanism for
determining appropriate pollution levels. 42 Thus, while neither common or statutory law is wholly sufficient, the legal pendulum is swing43
ing back ever so slightly towards common law tort actions.
State common law can be an effective means to prevent and remedy environmental pollution, 44 as well as provide full compensation for
harmed victims. In many circumstances, the federal environmental law
45
regime has proven ineffective. Faced with ever-tightening budgets
and the inconsistency of environmental enforcement from administration to administration-continuing through George W. Bush's presidency 6-it is no surprise that the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) has found it difficult to restrain polluters and restore already
polluted ecosystems; as a result, cleanup of Superfund sites has been
slow, 47 and federal agencies often fail to regulate certain pollutants,

38 See KUBASEK & SILVERMAN, supra note 13, at 135; YANDLE, supranote 8, at 108.
39 YANDLE, supra note 8, at 108.
40 For a historical discussion of modern environmental law, see generally RICHARD J.
LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
41
42

(2004).

YANDLE, supra note 8, at 108.
Id. at 159.

43 Cf. Meiners & Yandle, supra note 18, at 923-24 ("[P]rotection of environmental as-

sets seems to be headed back to its origins, to states, local governments, and local citizens
.... "); Kuhnle, supra note 8, at 214; Eric E. Nelson & Curt R. Fransen, Playing with a Full

Deck: State Use of Common Law Theories to Complement Relief Available Through CERCLA, 25
IDAHO L. REV. 493, 493 (1988-89).
4After
all, the primary goals of CERCLA are deterrence and restoration. SeeJason J.
Czarnezki & Adrianne K. Zahner, The Utility of Non-Use Values in Natural Resource Damage
Assessments, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 509, 525 (2005).
45 Felicity Barringer, The President's Budget: Environment, Clean Water Fund FacingMajor
Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2005, at All.
4See, e.g., Bruce Barcott, ChangingAll the Rules, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 4, 2004, at 39.
47 See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, ANALYZING THE DURATION OF CLEANUP AT
SITES ON SUPERFUND'S NATIONAL PRIORITIES LIST 8 (March 1994), availableat http://www.
cbo.gov (follow "Publications by Subject Area" hyperlink; then follow "Environment" hyperlink; then scroll down to "1994" section).
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such as carbon dioxide under the CAA. In addition, the cost recovery
tools of federal law have themselves become burdensome, while the
common law traditionally "allows for damaged parties to recover
losses."48

In general, it seems the differences between federal environmental statutes and state common law causes of action "mirror the
advantages and disadvantages of federal and state law generally."49
However, the advantages of the common law, at least in some circumstances, are substantial. Rigorous enforcement of state nuisance and
trespass law may promote a preference for prevention if the proper
signals are sent to potential polluters. 50 Under the common law, plaintiffs can recover damages to be used for cleanup and restoration, ob51
tain injunctions more easily, and enjoy broader liability parameters.
'52
The common law allows for a "broad array of damages,
yet defen53
emptor.
caveat
dants also can assert
This is not to say that there are not disadvantages with the common law. Courts may not be able to easily design and monitor cleanups, and predictable outcomes and national standards may not exist
without federal agency oversight. 54 Courts may also lack the necessary
information to fully assess and determine proper damage calculations, and injunctions may result in inefficient results.

55

The pros and cons of state common law actions are not limited to
legal consequences, but also to the practical logistics of plaintiff litigation. Plaintiffs, or in most instances their attorneys (in light of contingency fees), must hire expensive scientific experts and perform costly
and invasive scientific analyses of polluted sites. 56 Plaintiffs must also
be prepared to combat opposing expert witnesses. 57 Then again, with
48 Meiners & Yandle, supra note 18, at 959-61 (citing Randall G. Vickery & Robert M.
Baratta, Jr., Back to the Legal Future:Environmental Claims Come Full Circle as Plaintiffs Return to
the Common Lawfor Relief, NAT'L L.J.,June 10, 1996, at C1).
49Kuhnle, supra note 8, at 221.
50 See Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle, The Common Law: How it Protects the Environment, PERC POLICY SERIES, ISSUE No. PS-13 (May 1998), available at http://www.perc.org
(follow "Publication Library" hyperlink; then follow "Policy Series" hyperlink).
51Kuhnle, supra note 8, at 222-23. Consequential damages (for example, falling land
values) are available when using common law remedies. Id.; see also Meiners & Yandle, supra note 18, at 960.
52 Kuhnle, supra note 8, at 198; e.g., Meiners & Yandle, supra note 50.
53Kuhnle, supra note 8, at 224.
54 Id. at 225-26.
55Id.
56 Id. at 226; Meiners & Yandle, supra note 50.
57 See Michael C. Anibogu, The Future of ElectromagneticField Litigation, 15 PACE ENVTL.
L. RFv. 527, 573 (1998).
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financial risks can come high returns. If a plaintiff is successful, polluting defendants will think twice and proceed cautiously before appealing or continuing to pollute. The potential damages are high
(making settlement a worthwhile choice if defendants are found liable in the trial court), and it is in the interests of polluting defendants to avoid published appellate decisions stating that certain toxic
emissions or leaks are nuisances under state law, despite existing
58
agreements with federal actors.
II.

PREEMPTION? THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FEDERAL STATUTES
AND STATE COMMON LAW

In order to utilize the common law, these traditional state causes
of action must not be preempted by federal statutes. 59 Specifically,
does the Clean Water Act (CWA), Clean Air Act (CAA), or Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) preempt state common law doctrines, or is the state free
to provide its own common law remedies? The CWA and CAA do not
preempt state common law claims,

60

and CERCLA preemption law

still permits substantial state common law claims.61
A. Nuisance Preemption and the Clean Water Act
Much discussion has focused on the preemptive effect of the
CWA, with many analyses concluding that the CWA should be seen as
preserving preexisting remedies available under state law. 62 The Su-

preme Court held, in InternationalPaper Co. v. Ouellette, that the CWA
did preempt a Veimont nuisance law to the extent that the law imposed liability on a New York point source, but the CWA did not bar
individuals from bringing the nuisance claim pursuant to the law of
the source state (here, New York).63 Thus, while the CWA preempted
58 See Kuhnle, supranote 8, at 222-24; Nelson & Fransen, supra note 43, at 514-17.
59 We note that state statutes and federal common law are additional sources of au-

thority, and state statutes may preempt state common law claims.
6 See infra Part II.A-B.
61 See infra Part II.C.
62 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 287 (1994)

(citing Robert L.

Glicksman, FederalPreemption and PrivateLegal Remedies for Pollution, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 121,
172 (1985); Randolph L. Hill, Preemption of State Common Law Remedies by Federal Environmental Statutes- International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 541, 545 (1987);
Calvin R. Dexter & Teresa J. Schwarzenbart, Note, City of Milwaukee v. Illinois: The Demise
of the Federal Common Law of Water Pollution, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 627, 664 (1982)).
63 Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 497 (1987) ("The saving clause specifically
preserves other state actions, and therefore nothing in the Act bars aggrieved individuals
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one state's nuisance law from being applied in another state, the CWA
did not preempt a nuisance claim of the state where the pollution
originated.4 ' The Court is less likely ...to find federal preemption
of state common law because it begins 'with the assumption that the
historic police powers of the states were not to be superseded by [federal legislation] unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress." 65 The CWA does not expressly preempt state common law
remedies.66 To the contrary, it preserves such remedies within the savings clause of the citizen suit provision of the Act. 67 Legislative history
of the citizen suit provision also indicates "an affirmative recognition
that state common-law rights and remedies were meant to survive enactment of the federal statute." 6s Thus, pursuant to existing case law,
the plain language of the Act, and the legislative history behind the
Act, the CWA does not preempt state common law environmental
claims.
B. Nuisance Preemption and the Clean Air Act

Like the CWA, the CAA does not preempt state common law nuisance claims. 69 In another suit stemming from the facts of Ouellette,
the court held that the CAA did not preempt state law nuisance
claims by property owners for alleged air pollution damage arising
from a paper mill. 70 The court reasoned that "state law nuisance claims

have always been available to private parties suing for damages for pollution that travels between state boundaries. ' 71 Additional case law
supports the finding that the CAA does not preempt state common
from bringing a nuisance claim pursuant to the law of the source State."). For a critique of
current preemption jurisprudence and advocating allowing the nuisance laws of the affected state, see generally Ann M. Lininger, Narrowing the Preemptive Scope of the Clean Water
Act as a Means ofEnhancingEnvironmental Protection, 20 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 165 (1996).
A Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 497.
65 See Glicksman, supra note 62, at 183 (quoting City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S.
304, 316 (1981)).
66 See id.
67 Id. at 186 & n.366. The clause provides that "[n]othing in this section shall restrict

any right which any person ...may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(e) (2000).
68 Glicksman, supra note 62, at 187; see also Thomas C. Buchele, State Common Law Actions and FederalPollution Control Statutes- Can They Work Together?, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 609,
641-42 (1986).
69See RODGERS, supra note 62, at 125.
70
Ouellette v. Int'l Paper Co., 666 F. Supp. 58, 62 (D. Vt. 1987).
71Id. at 61.

10
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law claims arising out of various instances of air pollution. 72 Scholars
have concluded that the CAA does not preempt state common law
tort claims, using the same rationale as when discussing the CWA. 73
C. Nuisance Preemption and the Comprehensive EnvironmentalResponse,
Compensation and Liability Act

Sources diverge as to the extent CERCIA preempts state common law claims. CERCLA contains a savings clause, stating that "nothing ...

shall be construed or interpreted as preempting any State

from imposing any additional liability or requirements with respect to
the release of hazardous substances within such State." 74 Thus, it

seems that Congress sought to have CERCLA "work in conjunction
with other federal and state hazardous waste laws." 75 However, "CER-

CLA does preempt the application of state or local law to hazardous
waste contamination where the state or local law is in actual conflict
with CERCLA." 76 Courts have found preemption of state law where
there is sufficient conflict between the state law and CERCLA's contribution scheme, or where state law remedies would impair an effec77
tive cleanup.
Absent these limited scenarios, CERCLA does not preempt state
law claims, 78 including common law claims dealing with harm caused
72 See Gutierrez v. Mobil Oil Corp., 798 F. Supp. 1280, 1284 (W.D. Tex. 1992) (holding
that the CAA does not preempt source state common law claims against a stationary source
and reasoning that preemption of state common law actions would entirely preclude compensatory relief that plaintiffs may show is justified); see also Abundiz v. Explorer Pipeline
Co., 2002 WL 1592604, at *4-5 (N.D. Tex. Jul. 17, 2002) (finding that the CAA did not
preempt plaintiffs' state tort law claims, derived from a spill of MTBE-treated gasoline).
73 See Buchele, supra note 68, at 638-44; see also Andrew Mcfee Thompson, Free Market
Environmentalism and the Common Law: Confusion, Nostalgia and Inconsistency, 45 EMORY L.J.
1329, 1344-46 (1996); Kuhnle, supra note 8, at 210-14.
74 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a) (2000).
75 See New Mexico v. Gen. Elec. Co., 335 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1225 (D.N.M. 2004) (citing
United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1575 (10th Cir. 1993)).
76 Gen. Elec. Co., 335 F. Supp. 2d at 1225 (illustrating actual conflict means that it is impossible to comply with both the federal and state law).
77 See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Lodi, 302 E3d 928 (9th Cir. 2002); XDP,
Inc. v. Watumull Prop., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12057 (D. Ore. May 14, 2004); see also Gregory M. Romano, Note, "Shovels First and Lawyers Later": A Collision Coursefor CERCLA Cleanups and Environmental Tort Claims, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y Rv. 421, 441-45
(1997); Steven H. Goldberg & Amilia Sanders, CERCLA: Cutting a Wider Path by Preemption
of State Law Claims, ENVTL. LITIG. COMM. NEWSL., Dec. 14, 2004.
78 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, for example, found an industrial
company liable for creating a public nuisance and violating state environmental laws for
dumping hazardous chemicals in the ground near its manufacturing site. California v.
Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 782 (9th Cir. 1998). Even though the court lacked jurisdiction to
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by hazardous waste. 79 When CERCIA remedies are inadequate, a
plaintiff can turn to common law causes of action for relief, and there
is a modern trend toward the expansion of the common law so these
causes of action can coexist with a CERCLA action.8 0
III. Two

CASE STUDIES: INVOKING THE COMMON LAW

This section describes two cases attempting to use state common
law doctrines to abate environmental harm. 81 In the first, we focus on
the difficulty of stating a claim and proving causation, while in the
second, we focus on the evaluation of damage remedies. In Connecticut
v. American Electric Power Co., state and local governments have filed

suit against power companies under state public nuisance law in order
to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions.8 2 In Dyer v. Waste Management of
Wisconsin, despite the existence of agreements pursuant to CERCLA
between polluters and the federal government, landowners have filed
suit under state private nuisance doctrine in an effort to cleanup adjacent lands polluted with hazardous waste. 83 Can, and should, these
lawsuits relying on state doctrines of public and private nuisance
prove successful?
allow an interlocutory appeal on the CERCLA issue, the court had the authority to hear
both the nuisance claim and the state environmental claims, thus indicating that CERCLA
may not preempt state law actions. Id. at 775-77. However, it is not at all clear that preemption was argued, and California v. Campbell was decided earlier than Fireman'sFund Insurance Co. v. City of Lodi.
79 See, e.g., Feikema v. Texaco, Inc., 16 F.3d 1408, 1416-17 (4th Cir. 1994) (where the
Fourth Circuit concluded that state law claims for injunctive relief were preempted by
federal statute (although the federal statute here was the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), rather than CERCLA), but that state law claims for damages were not
preempted by the federal statute); Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., Inc., 426 N.E.2d 824, 826-31
(II. 1981); State Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 154, 160, 166 (N.J.
1983) (finding a corporation liable under theories of nuisance, strict liability, and a New
Jersey state environmental law); Wood v. Picillo, 443 A.2d 1244, 1245 (R.I. 1982); see also
Alexandra B. Klass, From Reservoirs to Remediation: The Impact of CERCLA on Common Law
Strict LiabilityEnvironmental Claims, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 903, 942-61 (2004) (discussing
case law where state common law claims have been used to deal with hazardous wastes).
s0 SeeJoseph F. Falcone, III & Daniel Utain, You Can Teach an Old Dog New Tricks: The
Application of Common Law in Present-Day EnvironmentalDisputes, 11 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 59, 63
(2000); see also Kuhnle, supra note 8, at 218-22; Nelson & Fransen, supra note 43, at 499508 (explaining that state common law remedies complement CERCLA and help obtain
full and timely relief).
81For another case study, see generally John Harleston & Kathleen M. Harleston, The
Suffolk Syndrome: A Case Study in Public NuisanceLaw, 40 S.C. L. REv. 379 (1999).
82 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
83 Dyer v. Waste Mgmt. of Wis., Inc., No. 01-CV-1866 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Waukesha County
argued Dec. 6, 2004).
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A. In Lieu of the Clean Air Act
1. Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions
An effective tool is needed to help abate overwhelming greenhouse gas emissions. Federal law has shown not to be the best instrument to mitigate greenhouse gas production since carbon dioxide is
not defined as a CAA criteria air pollutant requiring National Ambient Air Quality Standards, 84 nor as an air pollutant requiring emission
standards for new motor vehicles. 85 The federal government has
failed to mitigate carbon dioxide emissions 86 under the CAA despite
87
the plain language of the Act.
Dissenting in Massachusetts v. EPA-the case which upheld EPA's
decision that the agency cannot and should not regulate greenhouse
gas emissions from motor vehicles under the CAA-D.C. Circuit
Judge Tatel argued that greenhouse gases "plainly fall within the
meaning" of air pollutants to be regulated under the CAA. 88 Tatel
went on to argue that if the EPA administrator finds the gases contribute to air pollution that puts the public's health in danger, "then
EPA has authority-indeed, the obligation-to regulate their emis-

84 See also supra notes 3 & 6 and accompanying text. The Attorneys General of three
states-Massachusetts, Connecticut and Maine-intended to force EPA to list carbon dioxide as a criteria pollutant under section 108 of the CAA, but voluntarily dismissed the suit
in order to focus on litigation that carbon dioxide must be regulated in mobile sources
under section 202 of the Act. For further discussion, see Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Laboratories for Local Solutions for Global Problems: State, Local and Private Leadership in Developing
Strategies to Mitigate the Causes and Effects of Climate Change, 12 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. Rv. 15,
75-82 (2006); Richard W. Thackeray, Jr., StrugglingFor Air: The Kyoto Protocol, Citizens' Suits
Under the Clean Air Act, and the United States' Optionsfor Addressing Global Climate Change, 14
IND. INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 855, 888-94 (2004). However, the key question, regardless of
whether you seek to regulate pollution under section 108 or 202 of the CAA, is whether
any greenhouse gases can be considered an "air pollutant" under section 302(g) of the
Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2000) (defining "air pollutant" as "any air pollution agent or
combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical, biological, radioactive (including source material, special nuclear material, and byproduct material) substance or
matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air.").
85 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (upholding "EPA's denial
of a petition asking it to regulate carbon dioxide... and other greenhouse gas emissions
from new motor vehicles under § 202(a) (1) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (a)(1)"
in a 2-1 decision, with all judges on different grounds); see also Anthony DePalma, Court
Says E.PA. Can Limit Its Regulation ofEmissions, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2005 at Al1.
86 Other greenhouse gases include methane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons.
87 See Czarnezki, supra note 5, at 441.
8 Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d at 73 (Tatel,J., dissenting).
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sions from motor vehicles." 89 Currently, however, Congress has not
explicitly mandated regulating greenhouse gases, and EPA has not
voluntarily done so. Other than international initiatives, two other
options remain available to mitigate greenhouse gas production: first,
state and local responses such as state legislation, municipal programs
and initiatives, 90 and second, state common law remedies such as public and private nuisance.
A number of state and local governments have begun to consider
programs and policies to limit the production of greenhouse gases. 91
While some of these programs are voluntary, 92 there has been a
movement by state officials to recommend greenhouse gas emissions
limits. For example, in 2003, Maine passed a law setting a statewide
target for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 93 More recently, the
Governor of California outlined a non-binding proposal to reduce the
state's greenhouse gas emissions to year 2000 levels in less than five
94
years, and eighty percent less than 1990 levels in forty-five years.
89Id. A parallel argument was successfully made by plaintiffs in Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc. v.
EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1148-56 (D.C. Cir. 1980), where the D.C. Circuit held that if EPA
found lead emissions to endanger health and welfare, a nondiscretionary duty to list it as a
criteria air pollutant arose. Thus, this argument might prove persuasive in both section
202 and 108 suits. See McKinstry, supra note 84, at 76-77. But EPA, relying on FDA v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000), concluded that "in light of the enormous
economic and political consequences of regulating greenhouse gas emissions, Congress
would have been far more specific if it had intended to authorize EPA to regulate the subject under § 202(a) (1) of the Clean Air Act." Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d at 56 n.1 (citing
58 Fed. Reg. at 52,928).
90 However, states and municipalities are reluctant to pass such laws. SeeJonathan H.
Adler, Heated Nuisance Suits, TCSDAILv, July 27, 2004, availableat http://www.tcsdaily.com/
Article.aspx?id=072704C (stating that it imposes costs on a home state to call for state
legislation requiring significant emission cuts).
91See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, State and Local Greenhouse Gas Mitigation
Case Studies, http://yosemite.epa.gov/OAR/globalwarming.nsf/content/ActionsStateCase
Studies.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). For a detailed discussion of a variety of state and
local responses to greenhouse gases and global climate change, see McKinstry, supra note
84, at 26-58. Regional responses to greenhouse gases are also being considered. See Anthony DePalma, 9 States in Plan to Cut Emissions by PowerPlants,N.Y TIMES, Aug. 24, 2005 at
Al; Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, http://www.rggi.org/about.htm (last visited Jan.
4, 2007); see generally Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States: A
RegionalApproach, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 54 (2005).
92 See New Hampshire's Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reductions Registry,
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.* § 125-L:3 (2005); see also NEW HAMPSHIRE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, NEW HAMPSHIRE GREENHOUSE GAS REGISTRY, http://www.des.state.

nh.us/ard/climatechange/ghgr.htm (last visitedJan. 4, 2007).
9338 ME. REV. S. §§ 574-578 (2004) (calling for creation of a "climate change action
plan" to reduce in-state carbon dioxide emissions to 1990 levels by 2010, to ten percent
below 1990 levels by 2020, and eventually by as much as eighty percent).
94Katherine Ellison, Turned Offby Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2006 at Al 3.
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2. Common Law Claims and Connecticut v. American ElectricPower Co.
In the absence of strong federal or state initiatives, the common
law provides another option for mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions. As a primary example, in July 2004, eight states 95 and New York
City filed suit in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co. against five of
the country's largest power companies in an effort to force a reduction in carbon dioxide emissions. 96 Plaintiffs assert claims of federal
common law public nuisance, and assert public nuisance under the
state common laws where the power plants are located. 97 While the
companies do not dispute that carbon dioxide contributes to global
warming, they do challenge the plaintiffs' assertion that carbon dioxide emissions constitute a public nuisance.9 8 As the plaintiffs assert,
'The action calls on the companies to reduce their pollution, and
does not seek monetary damages." 99
Specifically, the complaint alleges that the defendant companies
have available to them "practical, feasible and economically viable options for reducing carbon dioxide emissions without significantly increasing the cost of electricity to their customers." 10 0 Plaintiffs seek an
order holding the defendants jointly and severally liable for a public
nuisance, and an injunction against each of the defendants to reduce
emissions by "a specified percentage" each year for at least a decade. 10 1 According to the complaint, global warming is a public nuisance because it adversely affects public health (for example, heat
deaths due to prolonged heat waves and asthma), coastal, water, and
agricultural resources, the water levels of the Great Lakes, and flora

and fauna. 102

95 The eight states are California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
96 See Editorial, A Novel Tactic on Warming, supra note 9.
97 Complaint 1 1, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 E Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y
2005) (04-CV-05669, 04-CV-05670). The power plants are located in Alabama, Arkansas,
Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
98Id. 23.
99Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Eight States &
NYC Sue Top Five U.S. Global Warming Polluters (July 21, 2004), available at http://www.oag.
state.ny.us/press/2004/jul/jul2 la_04.html.
100Complaint 5, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 265.
101Id. 1 6.
102 Id.
3, 108-40.
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Since greenhouse gases are not regulated under federal law, the
states may have viable nuisance claims under state laws.103 If global
climate change can be found to be a public nuisance and the defendant utilities responsible, the release of carbon dioxide can be abated.
However, some have questioned whether the three percent per year
emission reduction sought is sufficient to effect global climate
change, and, in turn, why the state attorneys general have filed such a
claim. 104 While these concerns are certainly legitimate (and exemplify
the difficulty in fashioning proper tort remedies), they question the
remedy sought and do not raise concerns about using state common
law as the underlying cause of action. That said, it is interesting to
note that the state attorneys general, except Wisconsin, did not target
facilities in their own states. 105
3. Proving Causation
Two major issues have arisen in determining the validity of state
common law public nuisance claims to abate greenhouse gases:
(1) whether plaintiffs can properly state a claim that the power companies intentionally and unreasonably contributed to global warming; 10 6 and (2) whether these claims are in conflict with U.S. foreign
policy or congressional regulation of global warming. 107

103 As stated, the complaint also asserts federal common law nuisance claims. Id. 1. Professor Adler has argued that these claims would not likely survive on the merits in light of
existing federal statutes. Adler, supra note 90 ("Despite their claims, a federal common law
cause of action for a public nuisance by carbon dioxide emissions is speculative, at best.").
While the CAA now has a comprehensive permit program like that of the Clean Water Act,
which has preempted federal common law (see City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317
(1981)), the CAA has not been utilized to regulate carbon dioxide emissions. Therefore,
since EPA has taken the position that the agency does not have the authority to regulate carbon dioxide emissions under the Act (see Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 53 (D.C. Cir.
2005); 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922 (Sept. 8, 2003)), perhaps "[t]his makes it less likely that courts
would find preemption of federal common law." Updates to Environmental Regulation Casebook, http://www.law.umaryland.edu/faculty/bpercival/casebook/chap2.asp
(last visited
Jan. 4, 2007); see also New England Legal Found. v. Costle, 666 F.2d 30, 32 n.2 (2d Cir. 1981)
(reserving judgment of the preemption question while noting that the CAA, unlike the CWA,
did not regulate pollution from all sources).
104 SeeAdler, supra note 90; RobertJ. Samuelson, Attorney Generals'HotAir, WASH. POST,
Aug. 11, 2004, at A21.
105 Adler, supra note 90 ("The state AGs could have targeted facilities in their own
states, bringing a series of state-law-based common law nuisance claims, but that would
have meant imposing costs at home.").
106 See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
107 See id. at 274.
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Plaintiffs could successfully state a claim for public nuisance under various state laws. As an example, under Wisconsin law, greenhouse gas emissions could constitute a public nuisance because these
gases interfere with public health and public comfort.108 In order to
effectively find liability for a public nuisance, a plaintiff must show the
"existence of a public nuisance" and that defendants had "actual or
constructive notice" of the nuisance. 10 9 Producers of greenhouse
gases cannot successfully disclaim these elements. They are certainly
aware that their power plants and facilities emit greenhouse gases
such as carbon dioxide.
Plaintiffs must also show that the defendants' "failure to abate the
public nuisance is a cause of plaintiff's injuries." "I 0 On its face, proving
causation might seem like a major challenge for plaintiffs. The defendants argue that plaintiffs cannot prove causation because their emissions represent less than two percent of global greenhouse gas emissions,1 11 and, while defendants know that their actions contribute to
global climate change, they do not agree that they could have known
that such emissions might cause the specific injuries asserted by plaintiffs.

112

In other words, defendants may contribute to global warming,

but they do not admit that global warming caused detrimental effects
to the plaintiffs. 113 Thus, courts may have to entertain a number of
scientific experts to discuss to what extent our health and natural resources are adversely affected by increases in global temperature.
While EPA describes many of these concerns as "uncertainties,"1 1 4 the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and U.S. Department of

108 Wisconsin courts have adopted the Restatement definition of public nuisance. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist. v. City of Milwaukee, 691 N.W.2d 659, 669 (Wis. 2005); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (2006). The Restatement requirements for
determining a public nuisance are not the same as those found in the CAA. See, e.g., Clean
Air Act § 202(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (a) (1) (2000), ("the emission of any air pollutant...
which in his [or her] judgment ... may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare.").
109Physicians Plus Ins. Corp. v. Midwest Mut. Ins. Co., 646 N.W.2d 777, 793-94 (Wis.
2002).
110 Id. at 794 (emphasis added).
I Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, at 47, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d
265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (Nos. 04 Civ. 5669(LAP), 04 Civ. 5670(LAP)) (filed Sept. 30, 2004).
112 Def.'s Reply, at 24, Connecticut. v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (Nos. 04 Civ. 5669(LAP), 04 Civ. 5670(LAP)) (filed Nov. 19, 2004).
113 See id.
114 U.S. EPA, Global Warming-Climate, Uncertainties, http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/
globalwarming.nsf/content/climateuncertainties.html (last visitedJan. 4, 2007).
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State have documented the adverse effects of global warming, 115 in16
cluding detrimental effects in many areas of the United States.
Therefore, while gases that emit foul odors have long been considered
public nuisances, 117 greenhouse gases simply create a different, and
more scientifically complex, harmful effect.
However, under Wisconsin's interpretation of the Restatement,
specific causal identification is not required since "public nuisance is
focused primarily on harm to the community or general public, as
opposed to individuals who may have suffered specific personal injury
or specific property damage."1 18 Plaintiffs need not prove that the defendants' emitted gases are present in the states suing and that these
9 As the court stated
gases became a hazard to the public. 11
in City of
Milwaukee v. NL Industries, Inc., "Were it otherwise, the concept of public nuisance would have no distinction from the theories underlying
class action litigation, which serves to provide individual remedies for
similar harms to large numbers of identifiable individuals." 120 Evidence that power companies each produced carbon dioxide emissions does create a genuine issue of material fact for a court to deter-

115 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, A Report of Working Group H of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers, http://www.grida.no/
climate/ipcctar/wg2/005.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
116 Id.; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers, tbl.SPM2, http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcctar/wg2/017.htn# (last visited Jan. 4, 2007); U.s.
Dep't of State, U.S. Climate Action Report-2002, at 110, http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/global
warming.nsf/UniqueKeyLookup/SHSU5BNQ7Z/$File/ch6.pdf (last visitedJan. 4, 2007).
117See City of Milwaukee v. Milbrew, Inc., 3 N.W.2d 386, 390 (Wis. 1942) (citing 2
WOOD, LAW OF NUISANCES 819, § 609 (3d ed. 1893)); see also Breese v. Wagner, 203 N.W.
764, 765-66 (Wis. 1925) (affirming trial court's conclusion that a constructed roadway was
a public nuisance for emitting offensive odors).
118 City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., Inc., 691 N.W.2d 888, 893 (Wis. Ct. App., 2004).
119 Accord Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, No.99-5226, 2005 R.I. Super. LEXIS 95, at
*5-6 (R.I. Super. Ct. 2005); Thomas v. Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523, 549 (Wis. 2005); cf. NL
Indus., Inc., 691 N.W.2d at 893 (rejecting defendants' claim that "the City must prove, at a
minimum, that NL Industries' pigment or lead paint or Mautz's lead paint is present on
windows in Target Area properties and that their conduct somehow caused the paint to
become a hazard to children."). For further discussion of the individual causation requirement, see Donald G. Gifford, The Challenge to the Individual Causation Requirement in Mass
Products Torts, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 873, 877 (2005) (citing William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 109, 131
(1983)) (noting that Landes and Posner have "mocked" the individual causation requirement). See generally Richard C. Ausness, Public Tort Litigation: Public Benefit or Public Nuisance?, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 825 (2004); Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., The Risks of and Reactions to
Underdeterrence in Torts, 70 Mo. L. REv. 691 (2005); Donald C. Gifford, The Peculiar Challenges Posed by Latent Diseases Resultingfrom Mass Products,64 MD. L. REv. 613 (2005).
120 691 N.W.2d at 893.
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mine whether defendants knowingly participated in the creation of
121
the public nuisance of global warming.
4. Preemption
As discussed in Part II.B supra, the CAA does not preempt common law nuisance claims. However, an alternative theory is that these
state claims are preempted due to other congressional action and the
goals of U.S. foreign policy.122 In this respect, common law claims in
the greenhouse gas and global warming context are unique because
trans-boundary greenhouse gas emissions have a global impact and
are subject to the foreign policy concerns of the political branches of
government. 123
According to Judge Preska of the Southern District of New York
in Connecticut v. American ElectricPower Co., in fashioning a remedy, the
court would be required to consider the impact of the relief granted
on "the United States' ongoing negotiations with other nations concerning global climate change" and "the United States' energy
sufficiency and thus its national security."1 24 Thus, she concluded that
the plaintiffs' complaints "present non-justiciable political questions
125
that are consigned to the political branches, not the Judiciary." This
holding has already been appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
121Accord id. at 894 ("Evidence that Mautz and NL Industries each promoted the use of
lead paint directly to the public and through sales staffs creates a genuine issue of material
fact for the jury on the question of whether defendants participated in the creation of a
public nuisance of childhood lead poisoning in the City of Milwaukee."). While the nuisance may affect the suing states, the plaintiffs likely must rely on the law of the source
states. Only Wisconsin is home to a plaintiff and a defendant power plant. As Professor
William H. Rodgers, Jr. stated:
One is tempted to predict that state courts are not likely to be overenthusiastic about proposals to mulct local business for the benefit of strangers residing across the border...
Actually, predictions of outcome are likely to be sensitive not so much to
the content of the law but to who is applying it. Nuisance law is pretty much
the same from state to state, and a federal judge sitting in Vermont might be
disposed to apply New York law for the benefit of Vermont residents.
RODGERS, supra note 62, § 4.3, at 287 & n.13.
122 Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, at 47, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d
265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (Nos. 04 Civ. 5669(LAP), 04 Civ. 5670(LAP)).
123 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 268-70 (S.D.N.Y 2005)
(discussing the congressional and presidential actions relating to global climate change).
124 Id. at 272.
125 Id. at 274.

20071

Rebirth of EnvironmentalCommon Law

the Second Circuit, and while there are strong reasons to be skeptical
of an affirmance, 12 6 such a ruling, if upheld, is likely limited to the
global warming context, and the political question doctrine would not
stop similar nuisance claims against air, land, or water pollutants as
12 7
they are generally not preempted by federal law.
B. In Lieu of CERCLA
1. Restoring Hazardous Waste Sites
While success stories exist, 128 EPA has faced difficulties in implementing the goals of CERCLA, and, in turn, cleaning up sites on the
National Priorities List (NPL). 129 This has occurred for a number of
reasons including politics and bureaucratic red tape, but the traditional criticism against CERCIA is that cleanup of Superfund sites is
too slow and too expensive. 130 On the other hand, there may be good
126 One may be skeptical that the Second Circuit will hold that this nuisance case is
non-justiciable as a political question as this is not the type of case dealing with the internal
workings of the other branches of government, see Nixon v. U.S., 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993).
In addition, the presence of political issues does not necessarily indicate a non-justiciable
political question. See Kadic v. Karadi, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d Cir. 1995). Is the question of
whether global warming equals a public nuisance best left to the political branches? Perhaps this is a question of institutional competence. See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, An Old
JudicialRole for a New LitigationEra, 113 YALE L.J. 27 (2003).
127 See supra Part II.
128 U.S. EPA, Archived News Articles and Superfund Success Stories, http://www.epa.gov/
superfund/accomp/success/index.htm (last visitedJan. 4, 2007).
129 For a brief evaluation of Superfund, see Katherine N. Probst & Diane Sherman,
Success for Superfund: A New Approach for Keeping Score (Apr. 2004), http://www.rff.org/
documents/RFF-RPT-SuperfundSuccess.pdf (last visitedJan. 4, 2007).
130 Part of this failure by EPA to enforce aggressively hazardous waste cleanup is merely
a result of bureaucratic red tape. In order for EPA to issue administrative orders to another
federal agency, it must first get acceptance from the Department of Justice. This requirement leads to prolonged negotiations, which in turn result in enormously slow responses
to CERCLA by polluters, including federal facilities. Shane Justin Harvey, Environmental
Law Survey, 71 DENyv. U. L. REv. 961, 967 (1994).

Despite Congress's directives, however, EPA implementation of the federal
hazardous waste statutes has had a tortured history. Cleanup of hazardous
waste sites has proceeded slowly. The EPA has failed to meet its statutory
deadlines, and Congress has severely criticized EPA regulations and policy
under both RCRA and CERCLA. Several causes account for these problems,
including the intrusion of partisan politics into Agency operations, the inadequacy of Agency resources, and the magnitude of the Agency's task. These
recurring difficulties have raised doubts about the viability of agency-forcing
as an approach to environmental legislation, leading some to call for increased administrative discretion.
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reason for slow cleanups; it takes significant time and money to produce scientific analysis that will lead to development and implementation of a site-specific remediation plan, especially if risk-tolerance must
be low.
Are CERCLA's perceived failures due to administrative failure or
responsible science? The empirical data is insufficient to answer this
question. Finding evidence of systematic agency capture is difficult
when cleanups are performed by state agencies and EPA regional offices that may vary greatly in their institutional cultures, effectiveness,
and reliance on traditional enforcement mechanisms. 131 Discussed
infra, the case of Dyer v. Waste Management of Wisconsin is arguably an
example of administrative failure or foot-dragging by a potentially responsible party (PRP). 132 Despite multiple time-consuming studies
and engineering actions, pollution may have continued to migrate from
a Superfund site into the property of adjacent landowners.
In addition, there may be reasons to be concerned about administrative failure when dealing with a single or dominant-PRP site. The
single or dominant PRP may strategically subvert agency control and
cleanup, something much more difficult to do in the dynamic environment of a multiple-PRP site where corporate influences will cancel
out, reducing the possibility of agency capture. Though even in the
latter cases, a single PRP may control and dominate the multiple-PRP
litigation and cleanup process, attempting to maximize future profits
while negotiating with trustees (for example, it is better to pay little
and delay now, and instead pay later).
At minimum, the sheer number of parties involved in the
cleanup of hazardous waste sites may result in jumbled and inconsistent enforcement. Evidence exists, however, that EPA embraces policies which may foreclose expedient cleanup and restoration of damaged property and resources. 13 3 EPA permits "reliance on natural
Developments in the Law--Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1458, 1474 (1986); see also
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 47.
131 Federal and state agencies serve as trustees to oversee the cleanup and the natural
resource damage assessment process. See, e.g., 43 C.F.R. § 11.14(rr) (2005) (allowing any
agency listed in the national contingency plan to be a trustee).
132 Dyer v. Waste Mgmt. of Wis., Inc., No. 01-CV-1866 (Wis. Cir. CL, Waukesha County,
argued Dec. 6, 2004).
133 OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE, EMERGENCY RESPONSE DIR. 9200.4-17P, USE OF MONITORED NATURAL ATTENUATION AT SUPERFUND, RCRA CORRECTIVE ACTION, AND UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANK SITE 1-2 (Apr. 21, 1999) [hereinafter OSWER DIR. 9200.4-17P];

see also Changes in Utility InfrastructureRaise NEPA Consideration,ARMY LAw., Jul. 1998, at 84,
85-86.
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attenuation processes (within the context of a carefully controlled
and monitored site cleanup approach) to achieve site-specific remediation objectives within a time frame that is reasonable compared to
that offered by other more active methods.' 1 34 Natural attenuation is
a restoration approach '"ithout human intervention."' 35 In other
words, it is a policy of "no action,"' 136 allowing for natural processes to
clean the environment over time. Natural Attenuation is unlike most
common law jurisprudence where the goal is to restore the polluted
37
area in the immediate future. 1
Natural attenuation certainly is an attractive solution for PRPs in
light of the costly nature of site cleanup. 138 Yet it does not encourage
cleanup in the foreseeable future and instead endorses long-term,
natural remediation. As other scholars have pointed out, "EPA endorses the use of natural attenuation as long as the proper evaluation
and monitoring are performed to demonstrate that human health
and the environment are sufficiently protected."' 39 Natural attenuation is permissible so long as the contaminant will decrease over time,
140
there is continual monitoring, and the time-frame is reasonable.
However, combined with EPA approval of cost-benefit analysis in
evaluation for site cleanup options, 141 seventy-five years can be con-

'3SeeOSWER Dir. 9200.4-17P, supra note 133.
135 The "natural attenuation processes" that are at work in such a remediation approach include a variety of physical, chemical, or biological processes that, under favorable
conditions, act without human intervention to reduce the mass, toxicity, mobility, volume,
or concentration of contaminants in soil or groundwater. These in-situ processes include:
biodegradation; dispersion; dilution; sorption; volatilization; radioactive decay; and chemical or biological stabilization, transformation, or destruction of contaminants. Changes in
Utility, supra note 133 at 84, 85-86.
136 Robert G. Knowlton & Jeffrie Minier, Recent Trend for Environmental Compliance Provides New Opportunitiesfor Land and Water Use at Brownfields and Other Contaminated Sites, 41
NAT. RESOURCES J. 919, 928 (2001); see alsoJames W. Hayman, RegulatingPoint-Source Discharges to GroundwaterHydrologically Connected to Navigable Waters: An Unresolved Question of
EnvironmentalProtection Agency Authority Under the Clean Water Act, 5 BARRY L. REv. 95, 12324 (2005) ("The mantra of EPA is that 'dilution is not a solution to pollution' ......
137 See infra Part IV.
138 See Erik Claudio, Comment, How the EPA May Be Selling General Electric Down the
River: A Law and Economics Analysis of the $460 Million Hudson River Cleanup Plan, 13 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REv. 409, 426-32 (2002); Knowlton & Minier, supra note 136, at 928 ("The
potential cost savings in remediation through the application of the natural attenuation
strategy .... .").
139 Knowlton & Minier, supra note 136, at 928 (citing OSWER DIR. 9200.4-17P, supra
note 133).
140 Id. at 929; see also Changes in Utility, supra note 133, at 85-86.
141 Knowlton & Minier, supra note 136, at 931-32.
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sidered a reasonable time period.1 42 Despite such long time periods,
EPA allows natural attenuation, although "very cautiously," to be the
1 43
exclusive remedy at contaminated sites.
EPA expects that sites that have a low potential for plume generation and migration are the best candidates for monitored natural attenuation. 144 But concern exists as to whether these strategies are consistently applied across EPA's regions, or even from one site to another
within regions.1 45 It is an open question as to whether regulators are
"only accept[ing] natural attenuation as a remedy when it meets all applicable, relevant, and appropriate health requirements."1 46 There is a
very real concern that natural attenuation will be used just to get contaminated sites "off-list" without good data and predictions as to
whether contaminants will actually be removed, and contaminated
groundwater will not be polluted downgradient in the future. 147
With the possibility of administrative failure in a given case, a
foot-dragging PRP, and the (over) use of natural attenuation and costbenefit analysis in site cleanup, sites containing a migrating or existing pollutant affecting a third party may not be remedied within a
reasonable timeframe. However, under state common law the same
pollutant would be considered a nuisance and promptly abated. An
advantage of the common law is that it serves as a tool for more immediate cleanup, in conjunction with CERCLA, to decrease response
time in dealing with an existing plume and ensure proper remediation. 148 Although, if CERCLA works properly in restoring the polluted
site and adjacent land, any common law claims may be minimal.
142 Id. at 931 (citing Robert G. Knowlton, Jr., Benefit-Cost Analysis of GroundwaterAlternatives at the DOE UMTRA Site Near Riverton, WY 18 (July, 1997) (unpublished report, on file
with authors)).
143 Changes in Utility, supra note 133, at 85 (citing OSWER DIR. 9200.4-17P, supra note
133); see also Environmental Law Division Notes, A my LAw., Mar 1995, at 35, 36 (stating that
natural attenuation can be "even a stand-alone remedial alternative"); NicholasJ. Wallwork
& Mark E. Freeze, ManagingEnvironmental Remediation Under Federal CERCLA, SL080 ALIABA 401, 419 (2006) (stating that natural attenuation can "be selected as a sole-remedy").
144 Changes in Utility, supra note 133, at 85; see Stephanie Pullen et al., Recent Developments in Environmental Law, 30 URB. LAW. 945, 980 (1998) (discussing when the use of
natural attenuation is appropriate).
145 See Ann R. Klee & Ernie Rosenberg, The Moribund State of CERCLA Reauthorization,,13 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 451, 453 (1999).
146 Environmental Law Division Notes, supra note 143, at 36 (emphasis added).
147 Joseph E. Odencrantz et al., Natural Attenuation: Is Dilution the Solution?, 40 LUSTLINE
BULLETIN 8, 12 (Mar. 2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/OUST/cat/LL40NatAtLpdf.
148 Another advantage of the common law is clearly the availability of personal injury
damages, unavailable under CERCLA. See generally Developments in the Law--Toxic Waste
Litigation,supra note 130, at 1602.
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2. The Common Law and Dyer v. Waste Management of Wisconsin
The now-closed Muskego Sanitary Landfill was permitted to operate in 1954 with consent from the City of Muskego, Wisconsin and
in 1971 with permission from the Wisconsin Department of Natural
Resources (WDNR). 149 Unfortunately, private wells near the landfill
were found to have elevated contaminant levels, eventually resulting
in the landfill site's addition to the National Priorities List (NPL) of
hazardous waste sites eligible for long-term remedial action financed
under the federal Superfund program. 150
In Dyer v. Waste Management of Wisconsin, landowners allege that
defendant Waste Management allowed and accepted illegal liquid
waste to be dumped at the landfill adjacent to their property. 151 Plaintiffs allege that this waste included vinyl chlorinated solvents used in
paints and degreasers that degrades into vinyl chloride, a known carcinogen, which later migrated from the landfill onto plaintiffs' properties.15 2 The plaintiffs allege that Waste Management did not have a
license to dump this liquid waste at the Muskego landfill 153 and that
154
the groundwater quality began to deteriorate around the landfill.
The complaint alleges that chlorinated solvents were found at dangerous concentrations in adjacent property owners' ground water, springfed ponds, and drinking water wells. 155
Plaintiffs assert a variety of state common law claims against Waste
Management, including: (1) negligence (failure to exercise duty of
reasonable care in operating the landfill); (2) private nuisance (substantial interference with use and enjoyment of land); and (3) trespass
(intrusion of hazardous and toxic substances from the landfill onto
plaintiffs' properties). 156

149 U.S. EPA, NPL Fact Sheets for Wisconsin: Muskego Sanitary Landfill, http://www.epa.
gov/R5Super/npl/wisconsin/WID000713180.htm (Sept. 2006) (last visitedJan. 4, 2007).

150 See id.
151 Complaint at
4, Dyer v. Waste Mgmt. of Wisconsin, Inc. (WMWI), No. 01-CV-1866
(Wis. Cir. Ct., Waukesha County Apr. 13, 2004). Co-author Mark Thomsen is an attorney
representing the plaintiffs in this case as well as the plaintiffs in the consolidated case of
Muskego Moose Family Center No. 1057 v. WMWI, No. 04-CV-912 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Waukesha
County Apr. 13, 2004). All materials relating to the Dyer case are available and on file with
the authors.
152 Id. 7 1-2, 4.
153 Id. 17 21-22.
I- Id. 1 25.
155 Id. 17 70-78.
156 See id. 17 96-118.
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Federal action has proven less than effective in this case. While
the landfill site was added to the NPL in the mid-1980s, even after remedial action, hazardous substances remain above health-based minimum levels.157 The remedial investigation and feasibility study began
in 1987 and was completed in 1992, construction of the landfill cap
and gas collection system were completed in 1994, and a limited
groundwater pump-and-treat system was completed in 1997.158 In

1998, owners of private residences located near the landfill were notified by the WDNR and the State of Wisconsin Department of Health
and Family Services that vinyl chloride was present in their private
water supply wells at concentrations that exceeded state and federal
drinking water standards. 159 Thus, federal regulatory action did not
restore the contaminated area or groundwater to the required regulatory standards. 160
3. Enforcing State Common Law
Statutory omissions, administrative problems, and enforcement
inefficiencies should not limit common law causes of action that might
provide additional remedies to landowners. In light of the inadequacies of the federal regime, common law principles have a role to play.
The common law, first, should not be adversely affected by the federal
role (for example, CERCLA compliance orders administered by EPA),
and, second, should force polluters to be seen as violators of state law,
16
serving as an important deterrent to environmental pollution. '
For example, at the preliminary stages of a hazardous waste common law action, expert witnesses should not be allowed to discuss
compliance with a consent decree. An expert opinion about an EPA
compliance order "simply has no appropriate role to play ...in the

common law causes of action which are being pursued." 162 A defen157U.S. EPA, NPL Fact Sheets for Wisconsin: Muskego Sanitary Landfill supra note 149.
158Id.

159Letter from State of Wis. Dep't of Natural Res. to Mr. Art Dyer (Apr. 28, 1998) (on
file with authors); Letter from State of Wis. Dep't of Health and Family Servs. to Mr. and
Mrs. Anthony Vitrano (Feb. 17, 1998) (on file with authors).
160 U.S. EPA, NPL Fact Sheets for Wisconsin: Muskego Sanitary Landfil4 supra note 149
("[T]he remedial action resulted in hazardous substances at the site above health-based
levels ... ").

Garlow, EnvironmentalRecompense, I APPALACHIANJ.L. 1, 9, 17 (2002).
of Proceedings of Sept. 9, 2004 at 60, Dyer v. Waste Mgmt. of Wis., Inc.,
No. 01-CV-1 866 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Waukesha County Sept. 9, 2004) (quotingJudge Skwierawski,
and referring to CERCLA's savings clause, which "preserve[s] common law obligations or
liabilities under state law").
161 See Charlie
162 Transcript
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dant's compliance with a federally dictated decree should not be relevant as to whether that defendant has violated state nuisance laws. Retired Wisconsin Circuit Court Judge Michael Skwierawski (acting as
Special Master) stated in Dyer:
Plaintiffs' argument about private nuisance causes of action is
absolutely correct. It is irrelevant whether Waste Management's conduct complied with CERCLA or complied with
standards set forth in the National Contingency Plan or any
other place if the Plaintiffs can establish that their conduct
and the activities on the property caused the leaching of hazardous cancer-causing chemicals into adjacent wells. That's, I
think, a fairly straightforward proposition. It doesn't make any
difference what they did or didn't do if that's what hap3

pened. 16

In other words, it is irrelevant whether a defendant has complied with
the federal rules-statutes, contracts, or otherwise-if there remains a
failure to comply with state law. Where there is no federal preemption, states must be free to determine what constitutes environmental
harm in their own jurisdictions.
State common law doctrines can therefore become effective deterrents of environmental harms. But, this deterrent effect can only
occur if compliance (or lack thereof) with the federal regime does
not automatically dictate a liability finding in state jurisdictions. 164
Again, Judge Skwierawski stated:
The bottom line remains that the-there are independent
common law obligations as argued by the Plaintiffs on theimpressed upon the Defendants that are to be analyzed separately and free from and apart from the existence of CERCLA
consent orders and the listing of actions to be taken pursuant
65

to those. 1

Consent decrees or compliance orders do not dictate what is an allowable release under state nuisance and trespass laws. 166 State law
163

Id. at 61-62.

164 See

id. at 64.
Id.
166 Id. at 63 (noting that compliance with a consent decree is not relevant in determining whether defendant's conduct was reasonable or constituted a nuisance); see also Garlow, supra note 161, at 9 ("[C]ompliance [with natural resource statutes] does not ensure
that an activity will not be subject to a nuisance claim.") (citing Galaxy Carpet Mills v. Mas165
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liability should not be affected by the enforcement culture in the federal government.1 67 We note that this conclusion cuts both ways. State
common law may be less environmentally friendly than a federal
agreement. Thus, a failure to comply with a federal arrangement does
not necessarily mean there has been a violation of state common law.
However, while it is arguably easier for the cause of action to proceed in this more traditional pollution nuisance case than in the greenhouse gas context, discussed supra, the proper remedy may be more
difficult to determine. 1 Yet, without appropriate (here, common
law) remedies, there will be no deterrence under state law. As Judge
Skwierawski stated:
The plaintiff makes a powerful argument, I think, about the
fact that if alternative sources of water are supplied and the
defendants are not required to clean up the mess that they
have made in the plaintiffs' view, then there is no deterrent
in the law. They can turn our underground water supplies
into sewers and just truck in more water. The community has
[sic] a whole just kind of sails onward. That's, depending on
the jury, a potentially powerful argument that may influence
a jury to agree with the plaintiffs' version of restoration damages being the most reasonable measure and the appropriate
measure to be assessed. It may influence one way or the other
169
the trial judge at the same time.
Thus, property owners or possessors may have a right to a clean
underground water supply, and the remedy that will fully compensate
such persons for the breach of this right must include cost of restora17 0
tion damages.

sengill, 338 S.E.2d 428 (Ga. 1986); Vill. of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., Inc., 426 N.E.2d 824
(Ill. 1981); Neal v. Darby, 318 S.E.2d 18 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984)).
167 Transcript of Proceedings of Sept. 9, 2004 at 62-63, Dyer v. Waste Mgmt. of Wis.,
Inc., No. 01-CV-1866 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Waukesha County Sept. 9, 2004) ("[S]tandards under
the common law requiring a landowner not to create a nuisance, public or private, cannot
be set by a process which is subject to the current whims in enforcement.").
16 See Massachusetts v. EPA 415 F.3d 50, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
169Transcript of Proceedings of Dec. 6, 2004 at 62-63, Dyer v. Waste Mgmt. of Wis.,
Inc., No. 01-CV-1866 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Waukesha County Dec. 6, 2004) (Skwierawski, J.); see
also infra note 202 and accompanying text.
170 See Transcript of Proceedings of Dec. 6, 2004 at 62-63, Dyer v. Waste Mgmt. of Wis.,
Inc., No. 01-CV-1866 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Waukesha County Dec. 6, 2004) (Skwierawski, J.); see
also infra note 202 and accompanying text.
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4. The Remedy and Damages
The common law has long recognized the importance of a clean
17
environment for private property owners and the public at large, '
and "[t]hose who poison the land must pay for its cure."' 7 2 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals observed "that access to, and use of, an undefiled underground water supply is a right of private occupancy,"173
and therefore, it has been the law of Wisconsin and other states "that
the cost of repairing and restoring damaged property and water to its
74
original condition is a proper measure of compensatory damages.'
Restoration cost is an additional appropriate measure of damages
even when the diminution in value to the plaintiffs' properties is considered.175 Courts have occasionally applied the rule that a plaintiff is
entitled instead to the lesser of the "cost of repairs or diminution in
value.' 76 However, this should not be a steadfast rule to be applied in
every case. 177 For example, the court in Roman Catholic Church of the
Archdiocese of New Orleans v. Louisiana Gas Service Co., 178 recognized that

the "diminished value land rule" is an archaic rule that does not truly
compensate a land owner for the wrongful acts of a defendant:
171 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 218 (Garland
Pub., 1978) (1783) (noting that it is a nuisance "to corrupt or poi[sJon a water-cour[s]e");
see also Hammack v. Mo. Clean Water Comm'n, 659 S.W.2d 595, 600 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983)
("Clean water is the essence and lifeblood of our society. Without it we will perish.").
172 State Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 160 (N.J. 1983).
173 City of Edgerton v. Gen. Cas. Co., 493 N.W.2d 768, 781 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
174 Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 665 N.W.2d 257, 1 57 (Wis.
2003) (quoting Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis. v. Hills, 561 N.W.2d 718, 725 (Wis. 1997)); Anstee v.
Monroe Light & Fuel Co., 177 N.W. 26, 27 (Wis. 1920) ("Since no further recurrence of
the nuisance is likely to take place, the court properly assessed damages for future as well
as past injury to soil and well occasioned by the acts of the defendant complained of. In
this way, and in this way only, could plaintiff be made whole in one action for the loss sustained by him by reason of the acts of nuisance already committed by the defendant.");
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Smith, 238 S.W. 56, 59 (Ark. 1922) ("[Tlhe measure of [plaintiff's] damage was not as for a total destruction of his well and the cost of digging another
one, as the learned trial judge found, but the expense which [plaintiff] would necessarily
have to incur in order to restore his well to its former use."). Under current law, individual
plaintiffs are entitled to the restoration damages. Compare this outcome to the common
fund discussed infra Part IV.
175 Laska v. Steinpreis, 231 N.W.2d 196, 200 (Wis. 1975).
176 See, e.g., id. For a discussion of doctrines to award restoration damages, see James R.
Cox, Reforming the Law Applicable to the Award of Restoration Damages as a Remedy for Environmental Torts, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 777, 781-802 (2003).

177 See Sch. Dist. No. 15 of Town of Granville v. Kunz, 24 N.W.2d 598, 599 (Wis. 1946)
("A reasonable argument could be made that in any case the cost of rectifying the damage
is the proper measure even though it may exceed the diminution in value of the damaged
property .... ").
178 618 So.2d 874, 877 (La. 1993).
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Recently, courts and commentators have criticized ... sim-

plistic tests which require the automatic application of limitations on an owner's recovery of the cost to restore or repair his damaged property. Such ceilings on recovery not
only seem unduly mechanical but also seem wrong from the
point of view of reasonable compensation. If the plaintiff
wishes to use the damaged property, not sell it, repair or restoration at the expense of the defendant is the only remedy
that affords full compensation. To limit repair costs to diminution in value is to either force a landowner to sell the
property he wishes to keep or to make repairs partly out of
his own pocket. Rules governing the proper measure of
damages in a particular case are guides only and should not
be applied in an arbitrary, formulaic, or inflexible manner,
particularly where to do so would not do substantial justice.
Limiting the costs of repairs to the diminution in value of
the property appears to fly in the face of the rule requiring
179
that the injured party be restored to his former position.
As one commentator stated, "Anachronistic limitations on recovery
based on property value fail to take into account the public's interest
18 0
in ensuring an effective cleanup.
V. THE COMMON LAW FUND

Stated simply, the common law strives for immediate cleanup of
pollution and condemns the destruction of the natural environment.
Federal environmental law, such as the CAA and CERCLA, strive for
179Id. (citing Myers v. Arnold, 403 N.E.2d 316, 321 (Il1. App. Ct. 1980)) (awarding $3.6
million to repair structural damage to an historic church building even though church
had no present intention to restore) (internal quotations omitted); see also St. Martin v.
Mobil Exploration & Producing U.S. Inc., 224 F.3d 402, 410 (5th Cir. 2000) (affirming
restoration damages award of $10,000 per acre which exceeded the purchase price and
market value of approximately $245 per acre); C.R.T., Inc. v. Brown, 602 S.W.2d 409, 410
(Ark. 1980) ("The fact that it would be expensive to restore the land to its former condition [was] not reason alone to overrule [restoration damages]."); Council of Unit Owners
v. Carl M. Freeman Assocs., Inc., 564 A.2d 357, 361-62 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989) (in a case
where plaintiffs alleged between $13 and $15 million in restoration damages and defendants alleged that the market value of the properties had increased, the court established
the measure of damages as the "cost of repair").
180 Cox, supra note 176, at 809. There are outer-limits to restoration value as the factfinder should, in determining damages, take into account what can be remedied costeffectively (in contrast to looking at the point of harmful exposure) and the underlying
conduct of the defendant. See id. at 808.
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similar outcomes, as the statutes' goals are deterrence, environmental
protection, and reduction and elimination of pollution.' 8 However,
CERCLA cleanups and consent decrees typically focus on federal standards, and not the often higher state standards. 18 2 Determining nuisance under state common law, however, would look to state air qual18 3
ity or toxic release standards.
The argument against using state common law is that it will lead
to increased litigation costs without the benefit of established federal
norms, as well as buck the recent trend to engage in faster, voluntary
cleanup with higher risk tolerance; hence the use of natural attenuation and cost benefit analysis. 18 4 However, under state common law,
cleanup can occur under state mandated contaminant levels (which
would determine what constitutes a nuisance under state law) and
judicially mandated time frames, working with additional financial
resources.
For example, the Wisconsin state standard for vinyl chloride in
drinking water is 0.2 parts per billion (ppb),185 while the federal standard is a much higher 2.0 ppb.186 If landowners are to have full beneficial use of their property, 8 7 there must be immediate cleanup to
achieve the federal standard instead of waiting many years for natural
cleanup, and if landowners are to have full use and enjoyment, then
any cleanup and restoration initiative must respond to state standards-a choice that would promote environmental federalism. 188
State common law, given the arguably ineffective existing federal
regime, makes it possible to achieve pollution deterrence and cleanup
in the foreseeable future under higher standards, and provides additional funds to reach an under-funded goal. 189 "From the standpoint
of a plaintiff whose property has become contaminated by environmental pollutants, damage remedies that are designed to promote full
18142 U.S.C. § 7401 (2006); Ohio v. DOI, 880 F.2d 432, 446 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
182 Cox, supra note 176, at 779-80.
183 See AndrewJackson Heimert, Keeping Pigs Out of Parlors:Using Nuisance Law to Affect
the Location of Pollution, 27 ENVT. L. 403, 460-61 (1997).
18 See id. at 414-15.
185 Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services, Vinyl Chloride (2004), available at http://www.dhfs.state.wi.us/eh/ChemFS/fs/VC.htm.
186 U.S. EPA, Consumer Factsheet on: Vinyl Chloride, http://www.epa.gov/OGWDW/
contaminants/dw_contamfs/vinylchl.html (last visitedJan. 7, 2007).
187 After all, the federal Maximum Contaminant Level Goal is zero. Id.
188 See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, JurisdictionalMismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 135-36 (2005); William W. Buzbee, ContextualEnvironmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 108 (2005).
189SeeAdler, supra note 188, at 135-36.
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restoration of property have been slow to evolve."' 9 0 The following
proposal for a common law fund doctrine, consistent with other equitable proposals to expand the scope of restoration remedies,1 91 will
help by creating more available resources and moving pollution
cleanup and deterrence efforts along.

A. Description
Judges have long invoked their equitable powers "to adopt appropriate remedies to meet the exigencies of a given case, " 192 especially when the case requires creative, flexible, and imaginative remedies because traditional forms of monetary relief, such as loss of
property value, are inadequate.1 93 Implementation of a common law
equitable remedy-the common law fund-would further promote
the use of state common law doctrines to restore and repair our natural resources.
Fashioned by state court judges, the common law fund would allow-and possibly mandate in the interests of public policy-damages
to be paid into a fund that could be used to restore plaintiffs' property, often adjacent to hazardous waste disposal sites, damaged by pol1 94
lutants. While money would go to pay for attorney contingency fees
and named plaintiffs may receive some remuneration, the substantial
majority of the damages paid would go to restoration, an outcome
that often takes too much time due to a shortage of federal resources.
Attorneys would be willing to take cases subject to the common law
fund because attorneys fees would be paid, and private plaintiffs190Cox, supra note 176, at 809.
191See generally Cox, supra note 176, at 777, 805 (suggesting that courts should expand
existing equitable trust doctrines and apply them to awards of environmental restoration
damages, and noting that it has been suggested by at least one court).
192State v. Seigel, 472 N.W. 584 (Wis. Ct. Aro. 1991).
193 See Howard W. Brill, EquitableRemedies for Common Law Torts, 1999 ARK. L. NOTES 1,
13 (recognizing the need for "alternative creative remedies when a simple exchange of
money as a form of substitutionary relief was inadequate[,]" and stating that "[e] quity has
inherent and broad powers to fashion, shape and indeed create a remedy to prevent, or if
time has passed, to correct a wrong. Those powers also exist, to be exercised creatively and
imaginatively, when the wrong to an individual is defined by the rights flowing from the
millennium-long growth of the common law.").
194 See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 900 n.16 (1984) ("[U]nder the 'common fund
doctrine' ... a reasonable fee is based on a percentage of the fund bestowed on the class
... ."); In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17456, at *9-11
(D. Mass. Aug. 17, 2005) (citing Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980))
("Courts have long recognized that a lawyer who recovers a 'common fund' for the class
she represents is entitled to be paid a reasonable attorneys' fee and her expenses prior to
the distribution of the balance to the class.").
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especially environmentally oriented ones or ones who think cleanup
of their property is worth more than the lost market value of their
property' 95-would

make use of the doctrine, as would non-profit en-

vironmental groups that now would have a mechanism to fund lawyers. 196 The amount of money to be paid into the fund would be projected reasonable restoration costs, and judges would not have to
allocate damages among various plaintiffs. Thus, plaintiffs would have
a remedy available that would allow for direct cleanup and full use of
their property in the post-restoration future, rather than be paid only
97
a likely smaller amount for their property value diminution.1
In addition, the fund would promote efficiency and would protect all future individuals who might be harmed by pollution. Without
the fund to clean up all adjacent lands, there is the potential for future, more costly lawsuits by landowners downgradient. 198 This potential will provide a strong incentive for PRPs to move early and cleanup
now, creating more sustainable business practices, and the fund could
resolve all liability for defendants as to potential future plaintiffs.
The common law fund (here, the actual monies) would require
judicial oversight to see that the fund is used properly to support
more aggressive, and possibly agency-supervised, cleanup and restoration. 199 A cleanup and restoration plan may be mandated by the court
itself-or in conjunction with a court appointed trustee, such as a state
environmental protection agency-or the fund could be used to support an existing cleanup plan.2°° In other words, the court, as part of
approving the settlement or as a judicial finding, would direct that
cleanup would commence. CERCLA would not preempt such a remedy because the fund would further effective cleanup by providing
195The common law fund is useful where the resource is undervalued by the market.
See supra Part III (discussing the inadequacy of measuring damages by diminution of
value). See generally Czarnezki & Zahner, supra note 44 (discussing the undervaluation of
non-use values, and discussing the importance of receiving full restoration costs).
196Accord Cox, supra note 176, at 802 (stating that a "'constructive trust' or 'equitable
trust' ... could be created for the benefit of future property owners, neighbors, and/or
for interested members of the general public").
197 1 DANIEL P. SELMI & KENNETH A. MANASTER, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 3.23

(2005) ("A consistent theme in case law discussions of nuisance remedies is flexibility in
the judicial approach to the problem. The court's basic aim is to adjust the conflict in a
pragmatic way and to settle on a remedy that will intrude least on the prerogatives of
property owners.").
198Cox, supra note 176, at 780 (discussing the interest in intergenerational equity).
199Accord Cox, supra note 176, at 807 (stating that the fund "should be administered
for the benefit of future property owners and members of the public").
200See Cox, supra note 176, at 808-09.
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direct resources to the trustees or plaintiffs in control of the cleanup
20
process. 1
The common law fund addresses the view that restoration is the
only appropriate remedy. For example, hazardous waste might pollute
well-water. Damages as a measure of diminution of property value often may be less than the value to a landowner of having clean groundwater. What if diminution of value were accompanied by an alternative water source? 20 2 Polluters should not be able to destroy public
resources, so long as they can provide injured parties with, for example, a lifetime and unlimited supply of bottled water or a connection
to municipal water. Instead, nuisance law and the common law fund,
like environmental statutes, are meant to both deter pollution and
restore already polluted areas. 203
Creation of the common law fund is not only within the equitable
powers of the judiciary, but its development is supported by the rationales for other fund-like arrangements.204 For example, using their equitable powers, judges in the class action context may invoke the cy pres
doctrine and allow for funds to be distributed, instead of individually,
20 5
for a benefit other than direct cash compensation to the plaintiffs.
Such distributions, like the use of the common law fund in environmental cases, can be used successfully because there is a close nexus
between the injury (the plaintiff's property damaged by pollution) and
the distribution (to the common fund), which would be used to rem-

201 See supra note 77 and accompanying text. A recent decision of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, New Mexico v. General Elec. Co., 467 E3d 1233, 2006 U.S.
App. LEXIS 26993 (10th Cir. 2006), attempts to clarify what remedies are available under
state common law when EPA maintains ongoing remediation efforts. On the one hand,
New Mexico limits the preemptive effect of CERCLA, permits usage of common law
claims, and supports common law damage remedies so long as the monies are used for
restoration and remediation purposes. See id. at *53-54, *60-61, *64-68. On the other
hand, the court explicitly questions whether common law claims can be brought before
EPA remediation efforts are completed, or, possibly, unless EPA admits that there will be
no remedial action on a certain piece of real property. Id. at *72-74.
202 Under many circumstances the diminished market value is not sufficient to make
the plaintiff whole. Does the furnishing of water or an alternative source of water make a
plaintiff whole in this case together with whatever diminished market value may have occurred to these properties? See Transcript of Proceedings of Dec. 6, 2004 at 61, Dyer v.
Waste Mgmt. of Wis., Inc., No. 01-CV-1866 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Waukesha County Dec. 6, 2004).
203See, e.g., Czarnezki & Zahner, supra note 44, at 525.
204 Like CERCLA's Superfund, fund arrangements are often found in statutory provisions. See Offshore Oil Spill Pollution Fund, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1824 (2006); Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, 26 U.S.C. § 9509 (2006).
205 See 4 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11.20
(4th ed. 2002).
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edy a much wider class of individuals (here, restore damaged property
of many adjacent landowners). 2 6 In fact, the common law fund would
directly benefit the plaintiffs, unlike traditional uses of cy pres that provide for more indirect benefits (discounts, charitable donations).
In addition, companies may be more willing to make payments
for an environmental fund rather than direct payments to injured
plaintiffs, 20 7 and the fund avoids the possible unjust enrichment if

plaintiffs would not "expend the recovered sums on actual property
restoration." 20 8 Finally, a common law fund may be the only way to
truly compensate injured plaintiffs. Like a class action suit, the number of individuals whose property is damaged may be large and many
potential plaintiffs are unlikely to file a claim, 209 meaning the common law fund may be the only way to ensure adequate cleanup and
restoration, 210 an outcome worth the potential windfall to non11
plaintiffs whose land or water source may be restored.2

206 See, e.g., In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litig., 216 F.R.D.
197, 209 (D. Me. 2003) ("[M]embers of the public (and thus potentially class members
who did not file a claim, as well as those who did) will benefit either in using the CDs
themselves or in the general public benefit from recurrent music CD availability."); cf
Stewart R. Shepherd, DamageDistributionin Class Actions: The Cy Pres Remedy, 39 U. CHti. L.
REv.448, 457 (1972) ("The goal of the cy pres remedy.., is to effectuate the normal damage distribution to class members as closely as possible, and this should be the purpose of
the courts whenever feasible.").
207 Companies are often more willing to pay to charitable funds. See, e.g., New York v.
Reebok Int'l Ltd., 96 F.3d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1996); In re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig.,
160 F. Supp. 2d 1392, 1393 (N.D. Ga. 2001); New York v. Dairylea Coop., Inc., 1985 WL
182520(S.D.N.Y
1985).
8
Cox, supra note 176, at 802.
209 See Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 484-85 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other
grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970) ('The class action is particularly appropriate where
those who have allegedly been injured are in a poor position to seek legal redress, either
because they do not know enough or because such redress is disproportionately expensive.") (internal quotations omitted).
210 Cf United States DistrictJudge D. Brock Hornby, Panel: The Use of "Coupon" Compensation and Other Non-Pecuniary Redress, Federal Trade Commission Workshop, Sept. 13, 2004,
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/classaction/writ-materials/hornby.pdf.
211 See 3 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, § 10.22
(4th ed. 2002) ('To the extent that cy pres distribution actually benefits a sufficient number of injured class members, the monies paid to third parties are an incidental but necessary cost that must be accepted in order to confer the benefits in a feasible way to a large
proportion of the injured class members. This result is fully consistent with and promotes
the historic objectives of class actions, which were originally created as a court rule of convenience.").
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B. Application
The common law fund is more easily applied to a case involving
hazardous waste releases where restoration costs may exceed diminution in property value. 212 The fund can be used to cleanup waste from
the property and begin immediate restoration efforts. However, in
some cases, restoration in the traditional sense is not possible.2 13 For
example, while air pollution can cause damage that allows for retrospective correction in the greenhouse gas context-for example,
cleaning off black soot or treating asthma in children-the air pollution is also trans-boundary, without "on the ground" effects as easily
detectable or remedied; this allows for only prospective relief in public nuisance cases to reduce greenhouse gases that cause global warming. 2 14 In these cases, the common law fund could be used, as an alternative to percentage reduction goals, for mandated use of better
technology and research to develop new technology to stop future
emissions.215 The fewer emissions in the future would then offset past
production, and industry may be more willing to endow a fixed amount
into a fund rather than deal with technology-forcing future reductions
that might result in business losses of unknown magnitude.
The idea of the common law fund can be an effective remedy
because it allows for both prospective and retrospective relief; thus
appeasing both those who seek restoration-governments and environmentalists-and those who lost and expended resources as a result
of the pollution, plaintiffs and the plaintiff's bar. 21 6 The common law
fund mirrors the supposed restoration and deterrence goals of CERCLA and other federal environmental statutes, and administrative
agencies will be willing to work with affected plaintiffs if they know
they might have an additional restoration fund available, leading to
217
less pollution in the future, and more efficient and faster cleanups.

212 See Cox, supra note 176, at 807 (discussing the similar case of Ewell v. Petro Processors, Inc., 364 So. 2d 604 (La. Ct. App. 1978).
213 See Garlow, supra note 161, at 10 (discussing the Exxon-Valdez disaster and limitations on retroactive cleanup).
214 See id. at 16-17.
215 Cf Garlow, supra note 161, at 17 ("Only by requiring that the violator reduce
air/water pollution in an amount equal to or greater than the illegal emissions will violators begin to restore the environment they have damaged.").
216 See Cox, supra note 176, at 779.
217

See id. at 780.
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CONCLUSION

Federal administrative agencies are designed to enforce federal
law. In the environmental context, EPA, with the resources it has
available, must look at polluters and victims on a case by case basis to
determine the appropriate course of action, whether such action is a
consent decree, litigation, a compliance letter, restoration, or nothing
at all. In this manner, administrative agencies function as common law
courts determining the rights and remedies of the players in the environmental game. 21 8 However, if federal administrative agencies are, in
fact, at least in some cases, ineffective common law courts because
they do not regulate environmental harms or cannot provide certain
remedies, then potential plaintiffs should invest their efforts in the
state common law. 219 State common law doctrines can effectively de-

termine what is an unreasonable act using state promulgated environmental standards, and provide for alternative or additional remedies. Meanwhile, judicially crafted remedies like the common law
fund-allowing portions of state court damages to be paid to a restoration fund-can effectively promote both restoration and deterrence
where federal action has proven less than effective.

2s See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco A Drug? Administrative Agencies as Common
Law Courts, 47 DUKE L.J. 1013 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein,Justice Scalia's DemocraticFormalism,
107 YALE L.J. 529, 533 (1997) ("Justice Scalia's discussion neglects the possibility that administrative agencies can discharge some of the functions of common law courts without
compromising democratic values.").
219 Cf Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation:Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of Temporary
Administrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. Ruv. 2010, 2011 (1997) (arguing that judges are already in a good position to act as "temporary administrative agencies" to deal with complex cases).

